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1. Introduction 
Industrial sectors differ in their preferred appropriation strategies. Empirical studies of 
appropriation strategies indicate variations in preferred instruments and the sectoral differences in 
the effectiveness of specific instruments (see, Levin et al., 1989). Despite this rich literature, the 
evolutionary economics literature has not examined the special case of durable goods. However, 
models predict that oligopolists producing durable goods face incentives to reduce the durability of 
the good so as to induce regular replacement purchases by consumers, and thus ensure the 
appropriation of the returns to investments in R&D (Coase, 1972; Bulow, 1986; Waldman, 1993). 
With these theoretical insights, the paper analyses the case of plant breeding, using wheat 
breeding in the UK for the years 1960-95 as a case study. Plant breeding provides a unique 
appropriation problem: plant varieties are easy to reproduce and multiply, and, for the most part, 
genetic characteristics are heritable, enabling a seed to replicate itself. Consequently, producers of 
genetic information face a problem in inducing farmers into regular replacement purchases. The 
problem in plant breeding, compared to other durable goods, is compounded by secondary 
competition from other breeders, seed merchants and farmers. A solution to this problem is to 
reduce the durability of varieties whilst simultaneously improving the efficiency of new vintages, 
i.e. planned obsolescence. 
The use of strategies of planned obsolescence in plant breeding has been recognised in the 
literature (Berlan and Lewontin, 1986; Lim, 1993), though clear analytical treatment and, more 
importantly, empirical evidence has remained lacking. The novelty of the paper thus lies in 
providing a useful methodology to study the case of planned obsolescence in plant breeding by 
relating the dual technoeconomic focus on efficiency and durability respectively to breeding 
strategies that are directed towards either incremental productivity improvement or limited and 
narrow disease resistance profiles. 
The paper is outlined as follows. It begins with a review of the literature concerning 
appropriation strategies in the context of durable goods, which suggests that monopolists face 
perverse incentives to undermine the durability of a good. The next section identifies the specific 
appropriation problem faced by breeding companies and briefly outlines possible options to 
appropriate the returns to investments in R&D. This is followed by an analysis of the case of 
planned obsolescence in wheat breeding in the UK, where empirically quantifiable indicators for 
varietal durability are developed and calculated. The section presents evidence of planned 
obsolescence in terms of (a) increasing proliferation of varieties, (b) diminishing varietal age, and 
(c) breeding strategies aimed at reducing varietal durability manifested in narrow disease resistance 
profiles. 
2. Theoretical Review 
Durable goods present a special situation concerning intertemporal links on the demand 
side. As the good exists across time periods, the supply of goods at different time periods are 
(imperfect) substitutes rather than complements (Tirole, 1988, pp. 72-73). Since future demand for 
the good is truncated by the durability of the product, the monopolist involuntarily engages in 
intertemporal price discrimination to capture residual demand
1. In an extreme case where price 
revisions are all too frequent, it has been conjectured that trade would take place at a price close to 
marginal cost causing monopoly profits to be eliminated (Coase, 1972). It is possible to avoid the 
‘Coase Conjecture’ and charge the monopoly price, if the monopolist is either able to make a 
                                                 
1 Ideally, the firm would like not to price-discriminate and sell the product at the monopoly price.  
 
credible commitment not to introduce additional units in the future, or offer a buy-back policy for 
additional units sold in the future, or lease the product rather than sell it. 
It is argued that “reduced durability may prove to be a better way out of the difficulty” of 
intertemporal demand compared to the options of leasing, credible commitment, or buy-back 
policies (Coase, 1972, p. 148). In the sense, repeated model revisions could ensure frequent 
replacement sales in the future thus making planned obsolescence a necessary condition for 
technical progress (Fishman et al., 1993)
2. The issue then is whether market structures impose any 
pressure concerning the choice of durability. Waldman (1996) demonstrates that monopolists 
producing durable goods have perverse incentives promoting investments in R&D which enable 
introduction of new vintages that make older units obsolete. For example, a textbook publisher 
would not only introduce a new edition but also seek to make the new edition different from earlier 
editions (Waldman, 1993). In doing so, the publisher succeeds to ‘kill off’ the market for old 
editions, which ensures that new students buy the latest edition. Empirically, it is also important to 
examine whether sectors and technologies reveal idiosyncratic properties that foster the adoption of 
strategies of planned obsolescence as a preferred mechanism to restore and protect monopoly 
profits. 
Variations in market structure place differing pressure on incumbent firms with respect to 
quality and speed of innovations. In competitive markets, a firm that lags in introducing an 
innovation may see its market share dwindle and be forced to exit the industry. Competitive 
adoption of the existing vintage is a necessary prerequisite for the firm to remain in the market, thus 
making it difficult for a firm to suppress an invention. The question remains whether similar forces 
exist within a monopolistic market structure (Bulow, 1986; Waldman, 1993). More specifically, 
firms in a monopolistic market structure are often suspected of either suppressing inventions
3 and/or 
producing goods with uneconomically short lives
4. Equally compelling is the rapid introduction of 
new models and quality changes in a product that not only reduce the value of earlier vintages, but 
force consumers into patterns of regular replacement purchases, such as in automobiles (Galbraith, 
1958). 
The relationship between durability and market structure is highly complicated and number 
of different model predictions are available (see Bulow, 1982, 1986 for details). For example, it is 
predicted that a monopolist selling the product, who is not threatened by entry, would opt for lower 
durability. By reducing the durability of the product, the monopolist reduces the quantity of the 
good available in subsequent periods, which increases residual demand and acts as a compelling 
commitment towards not lowering prices in the future. 
The above models suggest that new product development could be a proxy for strategies of 
planned obsolescence. Characterising R&D expenditures as an indicator of a firm’s desire “to make 
[an] existing version of a product obsolete” would allow an empirical test of the hypothesis that 
                                                 
2 Ironically, while Fishman et al. think that they challenge the theoretical contributions reviewed here, their 
characterisation of the problem reconfirms the predictions of the models. It may very well be the case that maintaining a 
steady rate of ‘incremental product improvement’, which delivers technological progress, is the firm’s preferred 
strategy of appropriation. 
3 The manufacturers of the QWERTY, who “had considerable financial interest in retaining the traditional keyboard”, 
successfully suppressed the adoption of the Dvorak keyboard (Frost and Egri, 1991). Dvorak’s non-jamming keyboard 
not only meant faster and easier typing, but reduced the demand for replacing and repairing typewriters. Other examples 
of suppressing inventions and adopting the less durable alternative exist in electric lamps, phonograph needles, stainless 
steel razor blades and electronic vacuum tubes (see Avinger, 1981 for details). 
4 When AT&T was forced by the Federal Communication Commission in 1981 to revert to selling its handsets instead 
of leasing them, the durability of handsets certainly fell (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 609).  
 
firms which sell, as opposed to rent, are more disposed towards planned obsolescence (Goering et 
al., 1993, p. 609). Using sales/rental and R&D data for IBM and Xerox, Goering et al. (1993) 
establish that as a firm increases its proportion of sales vis-à-vis rentals it invests more heavily in 
R&D. This is indicative of an incentive to speed up the development of new products, which is 
evidence of strategies of planned obsolescence. However, if the firm lacks the ability to make 
credible commitments on future R&D levels, does it lack the appropriate incentives to invest in 
R&D (Waldman, 1993, 1996)? Within a network externality setting, if a monopolist does not rent, 
the result will be suboptimal incentives in the second-period, leading to lower durability which is 
socially and privately suboptimal (Waldman, 1993). However, in other settings, pursuing a strategy 
of investing in R&D to make older products obsolete could lead to improved social welfare, even 
while the monopolist’s profits may suffer (Waldman, 1996). 
3. The Appropriation Problem in Plant Breeding 
The basic objective of commercial plant breeding is to produce new genetically uniform 
pure line cultivars – varieties that are genetically similar but distinguishable from other groups of 
plants within the same species (Poehlman and Sleper, 1995, p. 163-65)
5. While there is little 
agronomic virtue gained from the focus on uniformity (Simmonds, 1979, p. 60), it enables varietal 
identification for the grant of intellectual property protection (Fejer, 1966; Berlan and Lewontin, 
1986). That apart, genetic uniformity also enables the effective exploitation of scale and scope 
economies associated with the wider technology system surrounding uniform varieties, which then 
proliferates because of path-dependency, technoeconomic irreversibility and lock-in effects 
(Swanson, 1995). The method of producing new cultivars, despite biological and reproductive 
differences, involves three core steps
6. The first step is to generate variation by assembling 
germplasm with the desired characteristics that are sought to be recombined within the new variety. 
This is followed by identifying the desired recombination using appropriate methods of varietal 
selection, tacit skills embedded in the breeder, such as the ‘eye of the breeder’, and variety testing. 
Finally, once the preferred variety is selected, it is necessary to maintain the distinguishing 
characteristics of the variety through repeated cycles of propagation. Breeders work under two 
fundamental constraints (Allard, 1960, p. 50-51): 
•  Selection cannot create variability but plays with the assembled variation. Hence, the initial 
need to assemble diverse genetic material to generate variation. Naturally, the more diverse the 
genetic material assembled by breeders in the initial stages, the greater the range of variation 
from which the breeder makes selections. 
•  Selection can only act upon heritable characteristics and has little impact on complex 
characteristics that are substantially contingent on agricultural practices, other inputs and the 
environment. As a result, breeders tend to focus on characteristics that are more easily inherited 
and retained in progenies, which thus form the core objectives of breeding programmes
7. 
Paradoxically, the very success of a breeding programme in producing a new cultivar 
heralds an appropriation problem, which is unique compared to other durable goods. Apart from the 
                                                 
5 The focus on genetic uniformity is historically situated in the institutional choice exercised by breeders in the early 
decades of the 20
th century, coinciding with the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics, as a means of separating and 
distinguishing breeding from farming (Rangnekar, 2000a). 
6 The identification of these steps is based on a review of plant breeding texts like Allard (1960), Simmonds (1979) and 
Poehlman and Sleper (1995). 
7 The terms ‘focus’ and ‘core’ are used in a manner consistent with the evolutionary economics tradition (Dosi, 1982, 
1988; Sahal, 1990; Rosenberg, 1994).  
 
obvious recycling option available to other consumers of durable goods, seeds can be multiplied. 
Thus, after purchasing a bag of seeds from the market, a farmer
8 can potentially enter the market as 
a supplier of ‘similar’ seeds
9. Hence, the conundrum: why should farmers either return to the 
market for a fresh stock of seeds or pay a royalty on something they already possess (Berlan and 
Lewontin, 1986), particularly as most economically relevant characteristics are heritable (Buttel and 
Belsky, 1987)? Part of the answer lies in recognising the dual properties of varietal characteristics 
(i.e. genetic software) and physical attributes of the seed (i.e. diskette) (Lewontin and Berlan, 1990). 
As such, the durability of a variety is contingent on maintaining the software (i.e. purity of varietal 
characteristics) over repeated propagation and ensuring the reliability of the diskette mechanism 
(i.e. viability of seeds) as carriers of genetic information (Rangnekar, 2000b, chapter 6). 
Additionally, heritability of genetic characteristics differ across species, with natural out-crossing in 
cross-pollinated species causing loss of genetic purity
10. To a considerable extent, these diskette-
software factors mitigate against costless and easy market entry by ‘copies’. Further, breeders adopt 
a number of different strategies to enable appropriation, which span regulatory, organisational, 
technological and market-based approaches: 
•  Intellectual property rights and seed market regulation: Intellectual property rights in plant 
varieties, i.e. plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), tend to be the most widely noted and analysed 
solution to the appropriation problem (Godden, 1981, 1982; Dworkin, 1982; Lesser, 1987; 
Evenson, 1990). PBRs define the subject matter of protection as the plant variety, the latter 
being defined by varietal characteristics, and establish the scope of protection in terms of 
transactions involving the propagating material of the variety. Other regulations, such as seed 
certification, variety testing and national listing, are of crucial importance, though rarely studied 
in the literature. Yet some contributors draw attention to the importance of high standards of 
purity and quality under seed certification schemes in the European Union since the 1950s, 
which reinforced the differentiation between dedicated seed producers and grain farmers 
(Rangnekar, 2000b). 
•  Organisational solutions: Difficulties in appropriating the returns to R&D investments draws 
attention to information spillovers, or “untraded interdependencies”, generated by the 
innovation process (Dosi, 1988, p. 1146). These spillovers can be controlled through a number 
of organisational strategies. For example, a firm or group of firms can maintain exclusive 
control over specialised assets that are specific to the innovation (Teece, 1990). Alternatively, 
firms might seek to horizontally and/or vertically integrate into allied activities producing goods 
and/or services that are closely linked to the innovation. In the case of seeds, many 
commentators have noted the merger and acquisition activity between seed companies and 
chemical companies (e.g. Mooney, 1983; Juma, 1989; Hobbelink, 1991). In addition, horizontal 
integration between breeders, seed merchants and down-stream processors has also been noted 
(Lim, 1993). Unilever’s purchase of the public sector Plant Breeding Institute, Cambridge (UK) 
in 1987 is a reflection of this strategy (see table 1). Further, contracts that delimit the farmer’s 
                                                 
8 While the discussion centres on farmers, it is obvious that other breeders and seed merchants can use an existing 
variety and compete with the original breeder in subsequent periods. 
9 In reality, the production of ‘grain’ and the production of ‘seed’ are not identical activities and require different skills 
and incur varying costs. ‘Seed’ production requires more care and monitoring to safeguard against genetic 
contamination of the crop – a requirement reinforced by regulation. It is for this reason that an industrial division of 
labour exists at the farm level separating grain farming from seed production. 
10 Wheat, the subject of the paper, is self-pollinated. Hence, with little out-crossing, the wheat plant tends to maintain its 
genetic constitution over a number of generations, which gives farmers the opportunity to retain a portion of harvested 
grain to use as seed in the next cycle of cultivation.  
 
right in using genetic information (Marsden and Whatmore, 1994) are efforts at ‘controlled 
diffusion’ of the innovation. 
•  Discontinuous heritability
11: This technological solution specifically tackles the problem of 
secondary competition by attacking the viability of the diskette mechanism (i.e. the seed) as 
carrier of genetic information. Discontinuous heritability may occur by making specific traits in 
the variety deteriorate over successive generations (Lim, 1993, pp. 52-53), as in F1-hybrids
12. 
The economic sterility of saved seeds, as progenies do not retain the yield vigour of their 
parents, ensures that farmers return to the market for fresh seeds after each harvest (Rangnekar, 
2000b). More recently, biological sterility, i.e. zero heritability, has been achieved with the 
development of ‘terminator technology’
13, where the diskette breaks down completely upon 
single use, i.e. seeds saved from harvested grain do not germinate (Berlan and Lewontin, 1998). 
•  Planned obsolescence: The literature recognises that “a private breeder has a vested interest in 
reducing as far as possible the lifetime of his varieties towards the ideal that farmers should 
adopt new varieties every year” (Berlan and Lewontin, 1986, pp. 786-87). To achieve regular 
replacement purchases breeders could seek to modify the genetic software. For example, by 
introducing qualitative and quantitative changes in the latest vintage of varieties farmers could 
be induced to purchase the latest vintage (Lim, 1993, p. 52). Further, as will be demonstrated 
below, it is also possible to undermine durability by developing narrow disease resistance. 
Clearly, “claims that infer [that] breeders cannot appropriate utility from plant breeding 
without PVR [i.e. plant variety rights] are exaggerated” (Godden, 1981, p. 29). Breeding companies 
may adopt any of the above options singularly or, as is more the case, in combination. The rest of 
the paper is an empirical analysis of the option of planned obsolescence as an appropriation 
strategy. 
4. Appropriation through Planned Obsolescence 
Seed market shares can be examined either at the varietal or the corporate level, where 
varietal market shares refer to the share of a single variety
14. As companies invariably have a 
portfolio of varieties, corporate market shares are the summation of the relevant varietal market 
shares. Figure 1 brings together data on UK wheat varietal market shares for 1960-95
15, where the 
following tendencies are clearly marked. Firstly, the very high concentration ratios of the 1960s, 
where two varieties accounted for more than 80% of the total market, have diminished significantly. 
From the mid-1970s, the share of the market accounted by the top two and top five varieties has 
                                                 
11 Discontinuous heritability is a type of planned obsolescence. Yet, we differentiate between the two on the grounds 
that the former results from bio-technological solutions in the method of breeding plants that affect the diskette 
mechanism. In contrast, strategies of planned obsolescence are results of normal breeding of plants working through the 
genetic software of the variety.  
12 The history concerning the development of the technology of F1-hybrids is covered in Lewontin and Berlan (1990). 
13 The relevant patent was granted in March 1998 to the US Department of Agriculture and Delta and Pine Land 
Company, a private cottonseed company that was acquired by Monsanto in May 1998. 
14 All commercially transacted seeds in the European Union must be certified for its purity and authenticity (Ministry of 
Agriculture Fisheries and Food, 1993 for details). This certification process provides the data for generating market 
shares at the variety and/or company level. Market shares are based on the weight of seeds entering the certification 
process, which is the accepted practice in estimating market shares (e.g. Silvey, 1979, 1981). PBRs data collected from 
the Plant Variety Rights Office allows the identification of ownership in varieties across space and time to generate 
corporate market shares. 
15 Varieties that recorded market shares of ≥ 1% are included in the figure.  
 
fluctuated within a range of 30-50% and 70-80% respectively. Yet, these levels of concentration 
ratios are substantial given that wheat is self-pollinating and easy to replicate, and that breeders and 
farmers are legally permitted to either use or save the variety. The second marked feature is the 
increased proliferation of varieties, which is captured in the graphs labelled ‘Next 5’ and ‘Balance’ 
in figure 1. The market shares of these categories are significantly lower, varying between 10-23% 
and 5-13% respectively between 1975-95. However, the marked increase in the number of varieties 
is important to note. As figure 2
16 demonstrates, the number of marketed varieties in 1975 was 50% 
more than in 1965, while the number of protected varieties had doubled in the same period and 
tripled to 30 by 1980. Consequently, while an increasing number of varieties have successfully 
secured proprietary protection, only a small, but growing, subset are able to overcome the barriers  
to entry and establish market presence. To put this in perspective, of the total protected varieties, 
46% never registered any market share. 
In contrast to the dual tendencies of increasing proliferation of varieties and diminishing 
varietal concentration ratios from the mid-1970s onwards, market concentration at the company 
level continues to remain high (figure 3). The market share of the dominant company has 
consistently been above 35-40% throughout the period of study. In addition, there have been 
periods where the market leader has accounted for between 60-80%, such as the 1960s by Desprez 
and 1977-94 by Plant Breeding International (PBI). 
Clearly the composition of the market leaders has changed during the period of study: in the 
1960s and 1970s continental breeding companies like Desprez and Cambier were the market 
leaders; however, from the late 1970s domestic breeding companies, such as PBI, Nickersons and 
Zeneca have occupied this position. Interestingly, the latter companies have all been acquired by, 
and merged within, large multinational companies (cf. table 1). It is in this context of substantially 
high corporate market shares that the evidence of dual trends of increasing proliferation of varieties 
and diminishing varietal concentration ratios requires closer scrutiny and appropriate explanation. 
 
                                                 































































































































Of interest here is whether breeding companies have adopted strategies of planned 
obsolescence involving reduced durability and increased efficiency as a means to appropriate the 
returns to investment in R&D. Following the economic models reviewed earlier, could the direction 
of technical change be focussed towards improving efficiency whilst simultaneously reducing 
durability? The enhanced efficiency of newer vintages supported by the reduced durability of 
earlier vintages would together ensure regular replacement purchases. As such, empirical evidence 
of such strategies exists in the case of light bulbs, vacuum tubes for radios, and phonographic 
styluses (Avinger, 1981). For example, with respect to light bulbs, appropriation strategies and the 
direction of technical change focussed on (a) improving lamp efficiency but not in extending lamp 
life, (b) suppressing more durable alternatives, such as the introduction of fluorescent lamps and 
cold cathode fluorescent tubes. In the case of plant breeding the interlinking between increased 
efficiency and reduced durability could take any one of the following forms: 
•  The breeding effort: Breeders could focus on improving yield components (e.g. grain weight, 
number of ears, etc.) whilst compromising the disease resistance profile of the variety. Here, 
incremental productivity improvements act as an incentive for farmers to adopt the current 
vintage, while the limited disease resistance profile of earlier vintages militates against reusing 
saved seeds. 
•  Changing technology mix
17: Changes in components within the seed-input package can render 
existing varieties obsolete and promote the adoption of newly introduced vintages. For example, 
in the case of genetically-modified organisms, where varieties are bred to be 
resistant/responsive to brand name chemical inputs, changes in the composition of the tightly 
interlinked seed-input package would induce the farmer to adopt the entire package. As such, 
piecemeal adoption of the package limits the extent of possible economic gain. 
Independent of the specific strategy, an empirical referent for durability of varieties is the 
number of years a variety remains protected. As with other instruments of intellectual property 
protection, such as patents
18, we can safely assume that the decisions concerning renewing 
protection involve a cost-benefit matrix. These costs include the annual renewal fee and costs 
associated with maintaining the distinguishing characteristics of the variety
19. On the other side of 
the matrix are considerations involving the market share of the variety and the available 
competition. Consequently, the number of years a variety remains protected is an economic 
decision taken by the company. Reductions in the age of varieties are indicative of reduced 
durability of plant varieties. 
Table 1  




Owner  Historical Developments 
                                                 
17 This also involves modifications in the breeding strategies; however, separate focus is essential to draw attention to 
the relationship between ‘seeds’ and ‘inputs’ in a component compatibility sense. 
18 See Griliches (1990) for supporting argument in the case of patents. 
19 To enable legal protection, plant varieties require some unambiguous method of identification that would allow 
consistent identification throughout the period of grant (Lange, 1985). Thus, article 10(2) of the Convention of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants states the grounds for revocation of a grant as follows: 
The breeder or his successor in title shall forfeit his right when he is no longer in a position to provide the 
competent authority with reproductive or propagating material capable of producing the new variety with 
its morphological and physiological characteristics as defined when the right was granted.  
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Formerly Miln Masters Group 
formed by combination of independent 
breeding companies in the UK. 
Purchased by ICI in 1987. Divested by 
ICI in 1993 and renamed Zeneca Seeds. 
Merged with van der Have (Nl) to form 
Advanta (c. 1996). 
 
Source: Rangnekar (2000b). 
 
Using PBRs data it is possible to calculate the age of a variety, Ait, as the number of years at 
time t from the date of introduction/release of variety i
20. Bringing together the data for all varieties, 
we can calculate average age, At, in year t as, 
∑∑ =
i
it t i A A / …………………………………………………………….(1) 
The above indicator of varietal age suffers from a number of problems, similar to those 
confronted in using patent statistics as indicators of inventive activity (Griliches, 1990; Cohen and 
Levin, 1988, for relevant details), such as the intersectoral differences in the propensity to patent, 
which in the case of plants could relate to inter-species differences, and overlapping patents or 
dormant patents. It is necessary to develop a more accurate indicator for varietal age to capture the 
dynamics of changing product life cycles associated with the appropriation strategies of breeding 
companies. Using market shares as weights is considered a useful correction (Brennan and Byerlee, 
1991). The adjusted indicator is calculated as follows
21: 
                                                 
20 The introduction/release date a variety is taken as the date protection was granted. Given the regulations controlling 
marketing of seeds and the availability of legal protection from 1964 it is unlikely that firms would introduce varieties 
without securing proprietary protection, a fact validated by scrutinising the data. 
21 The practice here follows Brennan and Byerlee (1991) who however term the indicator ‘varietal turnover’ to capture 
the rate of varietal replacement on the field. It has been pointed out that the construction of this ‘rate’ is misdirected and 




it it t A A
~
………………………………………………………………... (2) 
where, Ãt is the market-weighted age of varieties in year t, and Ωit is the market share of variety i in 
year t. Naturally, equation 2 only includes extant varieties with a corresponding market presence, 
whereas equation 1 gives the average age for all extant varieties.  
Figure 4 brings together graphs for both indicators of varietal age for the period 1960-95. 
Three periods are distinguishable from the figure: an initial period, 1960-73, marked by relatively 
long-living varieties, a period of transition, 1974-78, marked by wide variation in varietal age, and 
finally, 1979-95, a period marked by short-lived varieties (table 2 for summary statistics).  
Period 1 is distinguished by high values for both indicators of varietal age. In particular, 
market-weighted age, which tends to rise during this period, has a mean value of 12.51 years. In 
contrast, average age has a much lower mean value at 8.03 years and tends to decrease during this 
period. The reason for the difference between the two indicators is the persistent popularity of older 
varieties, such as Cappelle Desprez, Hybrid 46 and Koga, which were introduced in the 1940s-50s, 
and account for over 70% of the market through the 1960s. Hence, the relatively high value of mean 
market-weighed age. In comparison, average age falls dramatically throughout period 1. 
Importantly, the large variance and standard deviation indicate that many protected varieties are 
short-lived. In this respect, the introduction of legal protection under the Plant Variety and Seeds 
Act (1964) provided stimulus for the release of new varieties that must have congested the borders 
of the market with potential entrants. Period 2, 1974-78, is a period of transition that is marked by a 







































Age 12.51 0.98 0.97 7.35 1.36 1.85 5.49 0.14 0.02
Max. Age 8.63 1.98 3.93 2.86 1.34 1.78 1.71 0.41 0.17
Average 
Age
Age 8.03 2.67 7.12 6.19 0.61 0.37 6.05 0.67 0.47
Max. Age 25.07 2.76 7.61 27.6 6.58 43.3 15.52 2.28 5.19
1960-73 1974-78 1979-95 Market-
weighted 
Age
Table 1: Varietal Age: Summary Statistics 
 
comparison to period 1. It is in this period that the number of plant varieties, both marketed and 
protected, increase: the average number of protected varieties per year in period 2 almost doubled 
compared to period 1 (cf. figure 2).  
The increased proliferation of varieties is accompanied by greater varietal turnover rates. In 
the sense, while older long-lived varieties continued to remain on the market, there is increased 
market penetration by new varieties that exhibit higher rates of turnover. The latter dynamics, i.e. 
more rapid turnover rates, are reflected in the decreased variance around the mean average age of 6 
years. The enhanced proliferation of varieties is an important component of the tendency towards 
reduced varietal lifespan. 
In period 3, 1979-95, these tendencies of increased proliferation of varieties and shortening 
lifespan stabilise at lower mean values:  5.49 years for market-weighted age and 6.05 years for 
average age. Not only is market-weighted age now below average age, but also the variance is 
lower than before. Indicative of the tendency towards rapid varietal turnover is the 38% decrease in 
mean average age from its period 1 level. Compared to period 2, the numbers of marketed and 
protected varieties have only marginally changed
22. This suggests that changes in varietal age are on 
account of increases in the rate of turnover. As such, the large number of protected varieties 
congests the borders of the market making market entry difficult. However, they also act as a pool 
of regularly changing varieties from which a select few enter the market for shortened durations. 
Clearly, the period from the mid-1970s onwards marked a new phase of wheat breeding in 
the UK that involved a dual strategy of maintaining a broad portfolio of constantly changing 
(protected) varieties, each for a shortened duration. In this respect, the market leader PBI 
performance is telling. During the 1975-85 period it had a portfolio of 14 varieties per annum, while 
in comparison, competitors like Nickerson and Zeneca managed only 5 and 2 varieties per annum 
respectively. As such, the increasing proliferation of varieties from the mid-1970s accompanies 
diminishing life spans. Yet, to complete the exposition of strategies of planned obsolescence it is 
necessary to examine breeding strategies, as that would reveal the technoeconomic focus with 
respect to reduced durability and/or enhanced efficiency. 
The focus on enhanced efficiency is evident in efforts aimed at achieving incremental 
productivity improvements in new vintages. One indicator of this effort would be yield. The 
adoption of dwarf wheats in the UK in the mid-1970s supported by widespread use of a range of 
chemical inputs (e.g. fertilisers, fungicides, herbicides, growth regulators, etc.) established a new 
technology mix that formed the basis for the yield increases. Breeders succeeded in exploiting the 
latent productivity by making the varieties amenable to the new mode of farming (e.g. closer 
cropping, intensive use of machinery, and chemical inputs). Average wheat yields increased from 
4.05 t/ha in period 1 to 4.50 t/ha in period 2 and reached 6.44 t/ha in period 3. The 1994 wheat yield 
of 7.35 t/ha was just over double the 1960 yield. 
Changes in varietal disease resistance profiles can be used as a proxy for breeding strategies 
aimed at durability. Developing genetic resistance to agronomic stresses and diseases is accepted as 
superior to the dependence on chemical inputs like fungicides, pesticides and herbicides (Bingham 
et al., 1991). Research conducted at the National Institute of Agricultural Botany, UK explores the 
relationship between varietal resistance and the changing significance of diseases in part motivated 
by evidence of increased importance of the disease Septoria tritici amongst UK wheats in the 1980s 
(Bayles, 1991). Field tests were conducted to examine the level of varietal resistance, which were 
                                                 
22 The respective averages for 1993-95 is markedly higher at 17 and 32.  
 
than mapped to the year of release of the variety, to enable a temporal examination of disease 
resistance profiles. The following evidence is indicated: 
•  The majority of varieties with superior resistance were introduced prior to 1976 (e.g. 
Cappelle Desprez, Bouquet, Maris Huntsman, Flinor, Atou, Mega). 
•  The most susceptible varieties were introduced between 1977-83 (e.g. Bounty, Hobbit, 
Longbow, Brigand, Norman, Avalon, Kinsman). 
•  Mean susceptibility of UK wheat increased sharply through the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
reaching its maximum value in 1982-84
23. 
Clearly, varieties of more recent vintages tended to have higher susceptibility. The effort to 
seek and develop improved genetic sources of disease resistance relaxed as fungicide use, 
introduced in 1970, and other growth regulators became widespread. Breeders themselves tended to 
focus more on securing incremental yield increases while tackling the disease resistance problem 
through the continuous development and introduction of new varieties with narrow and specific 
resistance (Rangnekar, 2000b)
24. Further, the proliferation of varieties with lower disease resistance 
profiles had a knock-on effect on mean susceptibility across wheat farms. The period identified by 
Bayles corresponds to the widespread adoption of dwarf wheats and the phenomenal increase in 
chemical inputs into agriculture. During this period, yield gains proved to be the dominant 
development goal (Interview, breeder: January, 1997). By adopting the chemical fix approach 
toward disease resistance, the industry proceeded along a “treadmill” cycle: a particular genetic 
software-chemical package being promoted until disease susceptibility leads to its abandonment, 
after which another package is introduced to resolve the specific disease susceptibility
25. 
Importantly, this strategy requires the continuous production and adoption of new varieties, not only 
to replace the susceptible varieties, but also as an insurance against unforeseen changes in the 
disease profile. In this manner, limited disease resistance profile leads to reduced durability of the 
variety which, combined with regular incremental productivity improvements, ensures the regular 
adoption of new vintages. Hence, the conclusion that wheat breeding companies in the UK adopted 
strategies of planned obsolescence. 
Conclusion 
The paper provides empirical insights into R&D appropriability in plant breeding through a 
focus on strategies of planned obsolescence. Breeders face a unique appropriation problem: not only 
are varieties a durable good, in that genetic characteristics are heritable, but easy reproducibility of 
seeds allows farmers, competing breeders and seed merchants to enter the market, thus aggravating 
the problem of secondary competition normally faced by a durable good producer
26. Hence, the 
specific interest of the paper in examining how corporate breeders have been able to appropriate the 
returns to investments in R&D, particularly since corporate market shares have remained 
remarkably high (cf. figure 3). 
                                                 
23Bayles used national acreage of each variety to weigh the recorded susceptibility for each year to arrive at this result. 
24The development of new varieties to replace susceptible older varieties indicates a degree of interdependence between 
the limited disease resistance profile of earlier vintages and the piecemeal nature of reworking the profile of resistance 
in contemporary varieties. 
25Simmonds (1979) draws attention to this boom-bust cycle of varietal popularity and susceptibility. 
26 Yet, as noted earlier (cf. fn10), the mode of propagation of the species and attendant costs in maintaining the software 
purity (i.e. varietal characteristics) and diskette reliability (i.e. viability of the seed), mitigate against easy and costless 
misappropriation.  
 
Adoption of strategies of planned obsolescence has been recognised in the literature (Berlan 
and Lewontin, 1986; Lim, 1993). However, an empirical identification of the same has not yet been 
conducted. Evidence reported here establishes that market-weighted age has fallen from a high of 
13 years (1960s) to 5.5 years (1990s). This decrease in the life span of varieties has been 
accompanied by a proliferation of varieties. In terms of the breeding effort, the strategy of planned 
obsolescence is apparent in the dual focus of improving the efficiency (i.e. yield increases) whilst 
simultaneously ensuring reduced durability (i.e. narrow and limited disease resistance), inducing 
farmers to regularly purchase fresh seeds. 
Importantly, the evidence reported here suggests that strategies of planned obsolescence 
might have a lower bound, in that the average life-span of varieties appears to have stabilised 
around a value of 5.5 years (cf. figure 4)
27. To an extent breeding companies face a ‘credible 
commitment problem’: how often to introduce new varieties and how substantive should the 
qualitative change be in the new vintage? This is similar to the problem faced by textbook 
publishers (cf. Waldman, 1993). A substantial delay in introducing a new edition (i.e. new varieties) 
allows older editions (i.e. earlier vintages) to enjoy some value, while a more dramatic change in 
the new edition forces ‘students’ (i.e. farmers) to adopt it. Yet, if these dramatic changes are all too 
regular, students might prefer to ‘lease’ the book rather than buy a personal copy. 
In the case of the seed market, companies tend to introduce new varieties on an annual basis 
so as to maintain a broad portfolio of regularly changing varieties. However, ‘textbook revisions’ 
tend to be nominal, with annual yield increases in the 1-2% range. It is the susceptibility of 
varieties, i.e. reduced durability that acts as a stronger factor in motivating adoption of the new 
variety. It is difficult to speculate on the future level of average varietal lifespan, in part because 
models predict that firms may prefer to collude on the rate of obsolescence as means to increase 
industry-wide profits (cf. Bulow, 1986). Empirical evidence validates this insight (cf. Avinger, 
1981). 
Two important questions remain in terms of the evidence of planned obsolescence in plant 
breeding. First, how does the evidence reported here relate to other strategies of maintaining 
monopoly control, in particular the use PBRs? A number of aspects of the PBRs system aid and 
abet the dual breeding strategies underlying planned obsolescence. To state briefly, the absence of a 
merit test for the grant of protection allows the introduction of varieties that register nominal 
productivity improvements whilst also might possess limited and narrow disease resistance. 
Remarkably, in the 1950s-60s breeders in Europe worked hard to establish a PBRs system that, in 
contrast to patents, did not have a merit test (cf. Rangnekar, 2000b for details). Second, is the 
methodology and evidence presented here an idiosyncratic feature of wheat breeding or 
generalisable to other crops? We suspect that planned obsolescence is an appropriation strategy that 
might be adopted by breeding companies across a range of crops. For example, much of genetic 
engineering innovation has resulted in the development of herbicide-tolerant crops, which provides 
a closer interaction between software (i.e. variety) and components (i.e. inputs). Consequently, not 
only is there a greater premium on adopting the complete variety-input technology package, but 
changes in either the variety or the inputs requires the adoption of the new technology package. Yet, 
we suspect there will be idiosyncratic characteristics in the innovation-appropriation dynamics at 
the species level. Additional research into breeding programmes across a variety of crops would 
shed useful insights. Equally, an analysis of farmer adoption issues, which have been totally 
neglected here, would be insightful. 
                                                 
27 I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for raising this point and suggesting further clarification.  
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